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5.1  Introduction 
Given the important economic linkages and the mobility of capital between 
the United States and Canada, it is important to understand and compare how 
the tax systems may distort the investment decisions of firms in the two coun- 
tries. Although considerable work on the distortions caused by taxes has been 
undertaken separately in each country, less has been  done in the way  of  a 
systematic comparison of the United States and Canada, especially on a his- 
torical basis. ’ 
A tax comparison of this sort is particularly important for two reasons. The 
first concerns the impact of the recent free-trade agreement on capital flows 
between the two countries. Differences in capital taxes that affect the relative 
cost of production may lead to an outflow of capital from one country to the 
other once tariffs are removed. The second concerns the recent tax reforms in 
both countries. The claim has been made in the popular press in Canada that 
the tax reform measures had to reduce differences in the taxation of income 
from capital so that  a flight of  capital to the United States would not take 
place. In other words, the corporate tax systems needed to be  made more 
“harmonious  .” 
Given the scope and complexity of the tax regimes in the two countries, the 
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1.  In the United States, cost-of-capital and effective-tax-rate studies have been undertaken by 
Auerbach (1983), King and Fullerton (1984), and Gordon (1985). Similar Canadian studies in- 
clude Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz (1984), Daly and Jung (1987), and Jog and Mintz (1989). For 
a survey on effective tax rates and an explanation of the differences in methodologies, see Boad- 
way (1987). 
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existence of distorting effects of taxation on the decision to invest in capital is 
not self-evident.2  A framework that lends itself to comparative analysis is thus 
required. Toward this end, we focus on the impact of taxation on the user cost 
of  capital  (Jorgenson  1963), which  is the economic cost of  acquiring  and 
holding the last, or marginal, unit of capital. We use the user cost of capital to 
compute a summary measure of the distorting effects of taxation on capital 
accumulation, conventionally  referred to  as the marginal  effective tax rate 
(hereafter referred to simply as the effective tax rate [ETR], as in Auerbach 
1983, King and Fullerton 1984, and Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 1984). The 
ETR assesses the effect that taxation has on the incentive to hold capital, by 
determining the amount of  taxes paid as a proportion of the operating income 
generated by the last, or marginal, unit of capital of a particular type held by 
the firm. The last unit of capital just “breaks even,” earning only enough in- 
come to cover the economic cost of  holding it. A positive ETR on a certain 
type of capital means that the tax system increases the cost of a marginal unit 
of  that capital relative to the income it generates, which means that it must 
earn more income in  order to break  even; this  discourages  investment.  A 
negative ETR means that the tax system actually subsidizes investment, low- 
ering the user cost and providing an incentive for firms to hold that type of 
capital. 
The tax system distorts the allocation of investment in the economy by af- 
fecting the investment decisions of firms, both among different types of capi- 
tal and among industries. These distortions impose real costs on the economy, 
as capital is inefficiently allocated. When  capital is internationally mobile, 
there  is an additional  concern  that tax  systems may provide incentives for 
firms to invest in one country rather than another. ETR differentials between 
industries and capital types in two countries imply scope for the tax-induced 
movement  of  resources  from  highly  taxed  capital  in  one country  to  tax- 
favored capital in the other. Whether this movement actually takes place de- 
pends upon a number of  factors, such as the mobility and substitutibility of 
capital between countries, sectors, and uses; differences in economic condi- 
tions; the institutional  and regulatory  environment; and labor, material, and 
transportation  costs.  Differences in  ETRs between  Canada  and the United 
States may not, therefore, actually precipitate a flight of  capital. We do not 
explicitly examine this issue, nor do we attempt to estimate how differences 
in the tax systems in the United States and Canada may have contributed to 
actual capital movements between the two countries. These require an exten- 
sive empirical investigation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, 
we seek merely to identify the distortions in the cost of capital caused by the 
tax systems in the two countries, and by comparing them arrive at some con- 
2.  We survey these differences for the current corporate tax regimes in an earlier version of this 
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clusions regarding the degree of “harmony” in the corporate tax regimes and 
the potential for tax-motivated capital mo~ements.~ 
We  calculate ETRs for various types of capital in different industry groups 
in both countries for large and medium-sized businesses, for the years 1975, 
1980, 1985, and  1990. Small companies taxed at lower statutory rates are 
ignored, since cross-country mobility of capital does not seem to be as impor- 
tant an issue for them. Due to the lack of  available data, we do not include 
property taxes,  sales taxes  on  capital inputs,  Canadian provincial  capital 
taxes, the Canadian tax on large businesses, or the corporate minimum tax in 
the  United  States.  We  thus compute ETRs only  for capital income taxes, 
which are important contributors to differences in the costs of  capital across 
the two countries. 
We  arrive at some rather interesting, and we think important, conclusions. 
Although  we  compute  ETRs  under  a  number of  alternative assumptions 
(which will be discussed at length in subsequent sections), we conclude gen- 
erally that in 1975 and 1980, ETRs were significantly higher in Canada than 
in the United States, for fully taxpaying companies. Although the extent of 
the distortions vary significantly by  industry and by type of capital, overall 
ETRs in these years tended to be significantly higher in Canada. This means 
that the Canadian capital income tax system tended to discourage capital ac- 
cumulation to a greater extent over this period than the U.S. regime did. To 
the extent that  firms were able to  choose freely between  Canada and  the 
United States when making their investment decisions, the capital income tax 
system in the United States may have attracted investments that otherwise 
would have been made in Canada. 
In 1985, just prior to major tax reforms in both countries, the difference in 
the overall ETR moderated somewhat. However, ETRs in  1985 were highly 
variable in both countries between industry groups and types of capital. Cap- 
ital in some industries faced very high ETRs, while capital in other industries 
faced very low (even negative) ETRs. The tax systems served to distort in- 
vestment decisions between the two countries, but also wirhin each country, 
between industry groups and different types of capital. 
The recent tax reforms in the United States (1986) and Canada (1986-87) 
changed matters somewhat. Overall ETRs for Canada in  1990 are still higher 
than for the United States, but to a lesser extent than was the case in the 
prereform period. Differences in ETRs between the United States and Canada 
3. Whether a comparison of  ETRs is the appropriate way to  assess the “harmony” of  the two 
tax regimes may be open to question; it clearly depends upon the issues one is addressing. In our 
case, when we are comparing the  pressure that  the  tax  systems may place upon the type  and 
location of  capital firms choose to employ, assessing differences and/or similarities in ETRs be- 
tween the two countries appears to be an appropriate way of measuring the extent to which the tax 
regimes are “harmonized.” Other measures or definitions of “harmonization” may be more appro- 
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for specific industries or types of capital have also been reduced. Thus, insofar 
as ETRs on capital in the two countries have converged somewhat, the tax 
systems appear to have become more harmonious, at least for fully taxpaying 
companies.  An important  reason  for the higher overall  postreform  ETR  in 
Canada is the treatment of inventories, which are taxed at a much lower rate 
in the United States. Our estimates indicate that the ETRs on buildings, ma- 
chinery and equipment, and land are quite close between the two countries in 
1990. This narrowing of ETRs between the two countries appears particularly 
important in light of the free-trade agreement, as the removal of trade distor- 
tions may make any tax distortions that continue to exist all the more impor- 
tant. On the basis of our estimates, we conclude that the overall ETR differ- 
entials  currently  existing  between  Canada  and  the  United  States  for fully 
taxpaying firms do not appear to give rise to a significant incentive for capital 
to flow one way or the other, at least relative to the past. Nevertheless, some 
significant differences across sectors remain: ETRs are much higher in Canada 
than in the United States in the Construction, Transportation and Storage, and 
Wholesale Trade sectors, while U.S.  rates are much higher in Communica- 
tions. There may be scope for some tax-motivated capital movements in these 
industries. 
All  of  the above results  apply  to fully taxpaying companies.  As is well 
documented (Mintz 1988; Altshuler and Auerbach 1990), Canada has a much 
higher proportion of companies not paying taxes in a given year. For a com- 
pany that has accumulated tax losses over time, the effective rate of  taxation 
may be significantly different from that faced by a fully taxpaying firm. We 
examine this issue for 1990 and find that Canadian tax-loss companies face a 
far lower ETR than their U.S. counterparts. Important reasons for this are the 
discretion allowed Canadian companies in claiming tax depreciation  deduc- 
tions, which may be postponed until the company becomes taxpaying, and the 
longer period  of  nontaxability  we estimate  for Canadian  tax-loss  firms. In 
addition, there is a much greater proportion of capital assets held by nontax- 
paying  companies  in  Canada  compared  to the United  States.  When  this  is 
taken into account, we find that the overall ETR on capital in Canada, aggre- 
gating over taxpaying  and tax-loss  firms,  is almost identical  to that of the 
United States. However, two factors suggest that the aggregate ETR estimates 
for Canada may be understated. First, the recent tax reform measures should 
reduce the number of  companies in a loss position over time, so that the ag- 
gregate ETR will increase. Second, in theory the existence of tax losses could 
raise, rather than reduce, the ETR on capital for start-up and risky companies, 
compared to fully taxpaying companies. If  we were to include these types of 
companies  in  our calculations,  aggregate  Canadian  ETRs would  likely  be 
somewhat higher (but then so would U.S. ETRs). Nevertheless, on the basis 
of  our estimates for tax-loss companies, we conclude that the ETR differen- 
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fully taxpaying case, and therefore that the scope for tax-induced capital flows 
is lower. 
Competitiveness of  tax systems is particularly important for cross-border 
flows of direct investment by multinational corporations. This issue is impor- 
tant, since multinational companies are taxed on their foreign-source income 
earned by branches and subsidiaries operating abroad. We  compare the ETRs 
on taxpaying U.S. multinationals with subsidiaries operating in Canada and 
on  taxpaying  Canadian  multinationals  with  subsidiaries operating in  the 
United States, with their counterparts operating at home. We  find that there 
exists a tax disincentive for U.S. multinationals to operate in Canada rather 
than at home, and a tax incentive for Canadian multinationals to operate in the 
United States. 
The divergent results for fully taxpaying firms, tax-loss companies, and 
multinational corporations emphasize an important message of  this study- 
that there is no single ETR measure that easily captures the rich institutional 
features of the economies and tax systems of the two countries. ETR estimates 
must thus be  interpreted with  caution and with an eye to the assumptions 
which underlie the estimates. 
5.2  Methodology 
In this section we discuss the method used to determine the effects of  taxes 
on the user cost of  capital. The theory has been presented extensively else- 
where (e.g., Boadway 1987),  so the discussion will focus on the areas impor- 
tant for an understanding of the ETR estimates that follow in subsequent sec- 
tions. 
The manner in which the tax system impinges upon the investment deci- 
sions of firms may be seen by  considering the following simple idea. Firms 
invest in all projects that yield a rate of return in excess of some “hurdle” rate 
required by the market. This hurdle rate is the real (inflation-adjusted)  market 
cost of the funds invested in the project, net of  depreciation, and is equal to 
the weighted average of the real interest rate on debt and the real rate of return 
required by  equity holders prior to the payment of  personal taxes.4 For ex- 
ample, if the nominal interest rate on debt is denoted i, the required return to 
equity is p, the expected rate of inflation is T,  and the proportion of  the in- 
vestment financed by debt is 6, the hurdle rate of return is R  = pi + (1 -  p) 
p - T.  If  we  assume for analytical purposes that investment prospects are 
continuously divisible, firms accumulate capital until the last increment earns 
just enough operating income, net of taxes paid by the corporation, so that its 
4. A risk  premium  may be included as well. In the  discussion that immediately follows we 
ignore risk. Risk considerations will be  dealt with in more depth later in this section. See also 
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rate of return is just equal to the hurdle rate.J This last increment of capital, 
therefore, just “breaks even” in an economic sense, and is referred to as the 
marginal  unit  of  capital. To  evaluate the impact of  taxation  on the capital 
accumulation decision, we determine how taxes affect the difference between 
the rate of return to capital, gross of taxes, and the hurdle rate of return. 
To develop the methodology, we first consider a closed economy, where all 
funds are supplied by domestic savers. Capital investment in a closed econ- 
omy is affected by both corporate taxes and personal taxes levied on the inter- 
est, dividends, and capital gains income received by the corporation’s owners. 
Owners of capital are concerned with the rate of return on their investments 
net of the payment of both corporate and personal income taxes. We initially 
show how the hurdle rate of return may be adjusted to reflect the payment of 
personal income taxes. 
If the expected rate of inflation is IT, the personal tax rate on nominal inter- 
est income is m,  and the tax rate on equity (perhaps a weighted average of the 
effective capital-gains  and dividend  tax  rate)  is c, then the  net-of-tax  real 
hurdle rate of  return is R” = pi (1 -  m) + (1 - p) p (1 - c) - T.  To  be 
viable, all investments must earn at least this net-of-tax rate of return, and the 
marginal project will earn it exactly. If household arbitrage holds, equilibrium 
in  the  capital  market requires  that  the  real  after-tax  rate  of  return  on debt 
equals  the real  after-tax  rate  of  return  on  equity,  or  i (1 - m) - IT  = p 
(1 - c) -   IT.^  Since we can observe i directly, but not p,  we may use this 
equilibrium condition to determine that p = i (1 -  m)/(  1 -  c), in which case 
R“ = i (1 - m) -  IT  is the net-of-personal  tax rate of return required on a 
marginal investment. Note that i = p only if m = c. 
The imposition  of corporate taxes on business  income affects the cost of 
capital in the following  way.  As indicated above, the firms will accumulate 
capital until  the rate of return earned by the last unit just equals the rate of 
return required  by  the market. To yield R” after personal taxes, a marginal 
investment must earn R  = pi + (1 - p) p -  IT  after corporate taxes. Let Rg 
denote the gross-of-corporate-tax,  net-of-depreciation,  rate of return on a unit 
of  capital required to yield R  after corporate taxes.  This gross-of-corporate- 
tax rate of return will reflect various tax provisions, such as debt interest de- 
ductibility, investment tax credits, and depreciation allowances. It appears in- 
tuitively that corporate income taxes affect the cost of  capital in the following 
way.  The deductibility  of  nominal  interest expenses  from corporate  income 
means that the nominal cost of debt finance to the firm is i (1 -  u),  where u is 
the statutory  corporate tax  rate. A company that  is given an investment tax 
credit (ITC) at the rate + and annual depreciation  allowances that yield  tax 
savings of  uA in present value terms on the original cost of  the asset faces an 
5.  Operating income is equal to revenues net of salaries. expenditures on materials, depreciation 
6. This is an assumption discussed in more detail below. 
of capital, interest, and inventory costs. 195  Tax Effects on the Cost of Capital 
effective purchase price of capital that is lowered by the amount uA (1 -  k) 
+ + per dollar, where the base for computing depreciation allowances is re- 
duced by the ITC at rate k (k = +  means that the tax depreciation base is fully 
reduced by  the ITC; k  = 0 means that the ITC does not lower the base). 
Corporate income taxes levied at the rate u on income also reduce the rate of 
return, gross of depreciation, 6, by (1 -  u). It is then possible to show that in 
equilibrium the before-corporate-tax-rate of return on a marginal unit of capi- 
tal, Rg,  must equal: 
(Rf  + 6) 
(1 -  u) 
Rg  =  ~  (1 - + - uA(1 -  k)) - 6 
where, 
(2)  Rf = i(l  -  u)P + p(1 - p) -  T.' 
Rf  is the real weighted average net-of-corporate-tax cost of funds to the firm, 
where p is the debvasset ratio of the company, which we assume to be deter- 
mined independently of the capital-stock decision.8 The present value of  de- 
preciation allowances on one dollar of capital, A,  is calculated by discounting 
the annual tax saving of depreciation costs by Rf  + IT, which reflects the fact 
that depreciation allowances are not indexed for inflati~n.~  The parameter k is 
equal to + in Canada, and 0 (prior to 1981) or +/2 (after 1981) in the United 
States. This is because the depreciation base is fully reduced by  the ITC in 
Canada and, after 198  1, only by one-half in the United States. The economic 
rate of depreciation, 6, includes changes in the real price of capital goods and 
physical depreciation. The right-hand side of equation (1) plus 8 is the con- 
ventional user cost of  capital expression in the presence of  taxes. The firm 
accumulates capital until the gross return to capital, the left-hand side of equa- 
tion (l), is just equal to the user cost. 
The ETR is the hypothetical rate of tax T,  which if applied to the gross-of- 
tax rate of return on the marginal unit of capital Rg, would just yield the net- 
of-personal-tax rate of return R".  Thus the ETR solves (1 -  T)R~  = R";  there- 
fore: 
(3) 
Rg -  R" 
Rg 
q-=- 
An ETR may be computed using the expressions for Rg  and R" given above 
for various types of capital in different industries in each country. The above 
expressions were developed for depreciable capital. They may be easily mod- 
7.  See Boadway (1987). 
8.  For models in which this is appropriate, see Bartholdy, Fisher, and Mintz (1987). 
9.  For example,  under a declining balance  approach, annual tax savings given at the end of 
each period is ua(  1 -  a)',  where a  is the declining-balance tax depreciation rate and r is the time 
since the asset was purchased. If this annual amount is divided by the factor (1 + Rf  + n)' + I, the 
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ified to determine an ETR for nondepreciable capital, such as land, by setting 
6 = 0 and A  = 0. A similar expression may also be developed for inventory 
capital, although  it  is  not  reported  here  (see  Boadway,  Bruce, and  Mintz 
1982). 
An important consideration in the computation of ETRs is what has come 
to be known as the arbitrage assumption. The issue arises because the corpo- 
rate  and personal  tax  systems  treat  various  sources  of  finance  differently, 
which means  that some agents may  face different  rates  of  return  on assets 
financed in different ways. The arbitrage assumption specifies who bears the 
tax differential on these assets (firms, savers, or both).  For example, in the 
above determination of the ETR for a closed economy, we assumed that rates 
of  return are such that savers receive the same after-corporate-and-personal- 
tax rate of return on a marginal unit of capital, regardless of the form of the 
investment-debt  or equity. The arbitrage assumption in this case is known as 
“closed economy household arbitrage,” because the after-tax return to domes- 
tic  households  is  assumed  to  be  the  appropriate  arbitrage  margin.  But  if 
households earn the same after-tax  return  on debt and equity, then the firm 
must face different after-tax costs for debt and equity. This can be easily seen 
be noting that the firm pays i(  1 -  u)  for a unit of debt finance, and p = i(  1 - 
m)/(  1 -  c)  for equity. Under household arbitrage the firm bears the entire tax 
differential unless it just so happens that u  + c (1 -  u) = m, in which case 
the firm is indifferent between its sources of finance.  Miller (1977) has sug- 
gested that this condition will in fact hold in equilibrium, if there are different 
classes of investors facing different personal tax rates. Miller’s model is not 
entirely applicable for our analysis, because it assumes that there is a single 
corporate tax rate in the economy.  But  statutory corporate tax rates  in fact 
differ both between and within Canada and the United States. Miller’s model 
would suggest that companies facing low statutory tax rates would be entirely 
equity-financed,  while  high-tax-rate  companies  would  be  entirely  debt- 
financed (see Bartholdy, Fisher, and Mintz 1987). This is clearly not the case 
in practice. 
Various arbitrage assumptions are possible, and ETR estimates are sensitive 
to the  assumption used.  In the calculations presented  in the following  sec- 
tions, we compare two alternative assumptions. The first is the closed econ- 
omy household arbitrage case discussed above. Although this assumption has 
been used to undertake international ETR comparisons in the past, it does not 
appear to be entirely appropriate when it is presumed that capital is interna- 
tionally mobile.”  In this case, a more appropriate assumption is one of “open 
economy arbitrage”, which was initially formulated by Boadway, Bruce, and 
10.  Of course, this is strictly true only if there are no agency, bankruptcy, or other costs asso- 
11.  The closed economy assumption was used by King and Fullerton (1984) in their compari- 
ciated with debt or equity. 
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Mintz (1984).12  Under the assumption of  open economy arbitrage, the firm 
must earn a net-of-corporate-tax rate of  return on capital at least as great as 
that required by international financial markets. For example, suppose that an 
investor can earn i on each dollar invested in Canadian bond assets or i* on 
each dollar invested U.S. bond assets. Let m’  be the tax rate on interest in- 
come and x’  the tax rate on foreign currency gains (g)  earned by the marginal 
investor holding Canadian dollar assets. In equilibrium  the investor is indiffer- 
ent between the two assets only if 
(4)  i(1 -  m’)  + g(l -  x’) = i*(l -  m’). 
If foreign currency gains reflect purchasing power parity, then g = T* -  P, 
which is the difference between anticipated rates of inflation in the two coun- 
tries. The relationship between Canadian and U.S. interest rates under inter- 
national arbitrage is then i = i*  + (P -  ~*)(1  -  x’)/(l -  m‘).  This implies 
that real rates of  interest, net of  personal taxes, are equal, but real rates of 
return gross of personal taxes are not, unless m’  = x’.  An equation similar to 
(4) must also hold for equity assets yielding net-of-tax nominal returns of  p 
(1 -  c’) and p*( 1 -  c‘) in each country. 
Interest rates are determined by international arbitrage, where the marginal 
investor holding a country’s corporate securities  may be some foreign investor 
rather than a domestic investor. Thus, personal taxes on domestic investors 
are irrelevant in the calculation of R”, as they determine only the supply of 
domestic savings and therefore whether the country is a net capital importer 
or exporter. Instead, we must determine the net-of-tax rate of return required 
by the international marginal investor for both bond and equity assets. This is 
not possible without making an assumption about where the marginal investor 
resides. Since the marginal investor’s tax rate is assumed to be the same for 
both Canada and the United States, there is no serious difficulty in measuring 
the cost of capital as long as gross-of-personal-tax rates of interest are observ- 
able, allowing us to ignore personal tax rates. However, to determine the re- 
lationship between p and i in each country, we must know c’,  x’, and m‘.  To 
abstract from this problem, we assume for our calculations that m’  = x‘ = 
c’, implying that i -  P = p -  P = i*  -  P* = p* -  T*  andR” = R in the 
above equations.’) An alternative case in which m‘,  x’,  and c’ are not equal 
12. Gordon (1986) models an international equilibrium using a model similar to that of Miller 
(1977) and derives a capital market equilibrium similar to that discussed in Boadway, Bruce, and 
Mintz (1984). In Gordon’s model, the identity of the investor who is indifferent between holding 
an asset of a particular country or that of another depends on each country’s inflation rate and the 
difference between taxes on interest income and capital gains. Investors facing high personal tax 
rates on interest tend to hold unindexed bond assets originating in countries with high inflation 
rates. 
13.  One case in which this obviously holds is when there are no taxes levied on interest or 
equity income earned by the marginal investor. This is the case if  the marginal investor is a tax- 
exempt institution or an individual residing in a country with no capital income taxes (which may 
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was also considered. In this case, real net-of-tax interest rates are not the same 
across countries,  and therefore hurdle rates of return differ across countries. 
Calculations for this case are not reported, as they do not substantially change 
our conclusions. 
As we assume that the marginal investor is the same for both countries, the 
ETR estimates for the open economy arbitrage case reflect only differences in 
corporate tax provisions,  rather than  differences in personal  tax rates. With 
equal rates of personal tax on equity and debt, the open economy arbitrage 
assumption restricts real  interest rates  to be the same in the two countries, 
although nominal interest rates and rates of inflation may differ. It is our belief 
that the case of open economy  arbitrage,  with m‘  = x’  = c’,  provides the 
most meaningful basis for comparison between the United States and Canada; 
we thus treat this as our “base case” against which the alternative assumption 
of closed economy household arbitrage is measured. 
Aside from the arbitrage assumption, a number of other assumptions must 
be made in the computation of ETRs. Two particularly important ones involve 
the treatment of risk and loss offsetting. We deal with each in turn. 
Following Gordon (1983, Bulow and Summers (1984), Gordon and Wil- 
son (1989), and McKenzie (1989), a distinction is made between two types of 
risk that are important in the calculation of ETRs. Zncome risk refers to uncer- 
tainty regarding future net revenues, arising from the stochastic movement of 
output prices or demand faced by the firm. Capital risk refers to uncertainty 
regarding the economic rate of depreciation, due either to an unknown future 
supply price of capital or a stochastic physical rate of depreciation. 
If the tax system grants full loss offsets,  so that companies receive a full 
refund for taxable losses when they are incurred, as was assumed in the pre- 
ceding discussion, then an income risk premium, h‘,  may be added to both R“ 
and Rg  in the above equations. However, if we then express the rate of return 
on capital net of risk, and subtract the income risk premium from the net and 
gross rates of  return,  it is evident that the ETR expression for income-risky 
investments is identical to the expression for equivalent riskless investments. 
The reason for this is intuitive. With full loss offsetting, the tax liability of the 
firm fluctuates  perfectly  with  its  income.  The government therefore shares 
equally  in both  the profits  and losses of  the  company. In other words,  the 
government  shares in  1OOu%  of the profits and absorbs  100~4%  of the risk. 
The cost of bearing income risk (h? is thus implicitly fully deducted in a full 
loss offset tax system, and no additional distortions are introduced for income- 
risky investments vis-a-vis comparable riskless investments. 
The matter is somewhat different for capital-risky investments. In both the 
United States and Canada, tax depreciation allowances are based on the orig- 
inal cost of the asset, and there is no accrual valuation of  capital gains and 
losses on the assets. This means that tax depreciation allowances and accrued 
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placement value of the capital. The implication is that the tax system does not 
deduct the full cost of bearing capital risk. The imputed cost of bearing capital 
risk can be thought of as an upward adjustment in the economic rate of depre- 
ciation that is not compensated for by an equivalent increase in the tax depre- 
ciation rate. With the capital risk premium denoted by hc,  the ETR for capital- 
risky  investments may  be  determined by  replacing 6 with  S  +  hc in  the 
expression for Rg  in equation (1). 
One of the problems in measuring ETRs on risky capital is that it is difficult 
to measure the risk premium associated with capital risk. We  follow Bulow 
and Summers (1984), who argue that the market value of a firm is equal to its 
asset value, so that fluctuations in market values reflect changes in the value 
of the firm’s underlying assets. This implies that capital-asset-pricing-model 
(CAPM) estimates would be appropriate to use for the capital risk premium. 
However, as Gordon and Wilson (1989) point out, it is the correlation between 
the economic cost of depreciation and consumption that is really relevant, and 
this correlation could well be negative. If  that were the case, we  would err 
considerably in our use of CAPM estimates for risk premiums.14 
The analysis to this point has assumed that the tax system allows for the full 
refundability of tax losses, or equivalently, that all companies are fully taxpay- 
ing. Although the resulting ETR estimates are informative, only about 50% 
of  investment in Canada and 80% in the United States is conducted by  firms 
that are fully taxpaying at a particular point of time. For firms that are experi- 
encing tax losses, the assumption of  full loss offsetting is not appropriate. A 
firm may be in a nontaxable position, for example, due to large banks of  past 
tax  losses. In  this case,  the income (write-offs) generated by  the marginal 
investment may not be taxed (deducted) until some later time. Alternatively, a 
young firm may be making its initial investment, which will earn income only 
at some later, uncertain time. In that case, tax credits and deductions cannot 
be written off  against income generated from past investments and must be 
postponed. 
Loss offsetting is imperfect in Canada and the United States. In both coun- 
tries, tax losses may be carried back for three years. In  the United States, 
operating losses may be carried forward for fifteen years, but without interest. 
In Canada the carry-forward period (also without interest) is only seven years; 
14.  See the paper by Shoven and Topper (ch. 6 in this volume), for a more in-depth discussion 
of the effects of  risk. Although our approach is similar, it differs in some important respects. First, 
Shoven and Topper consider the cost of capital under a continuum of risk premiums, while our 
calculations are based upon specific risk-premium estimates taken from Jog and Mintz (1988). 
which differ by  industry. Second, Shoven and Topper use price-earnings ratios to determine the 
market-risk premium, while we again use an estimate based on the CAPM from Jog and Mintz 
(1988). Third, our ETRs are disaggregated by  industry and asset type; Shoven and Topper con- 
sider illustrative investments in a manufacturing plant and automobiles. Finally, our treatment of 
income risk differs slightly; see Boadway, McKenzie, and Mintz (1989) for a formal derivation of 
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however, depreciation and other important capital cost deductions may effec- 
tively  be  carried  forward indefinitely, due  to  their  discretionary nature.I5 
Moreover, consolidated tax accounting is allowed in the United States, but not 
in Canada. This means that the losses of U.S. firms can be offset against the 
profits of  associated companies. Given the different treatment of  operating 
losses, it is important to determine how the ETRs for loss corporations may 
differ between the two countries. To compute ETRs for loss corporations, we 
assume that the firm is risk-neutral and in an initial tax-loss position, expect- 
ing to become taxable T years from the current period t. Given the paucity of 
data, we only undertake calculations for 1990, when there was no investment 
tax credit.  We  estimate a “tax loss refundability parameter,” 5 = (1 +  p 
+ T)  -(T-f),  which is the present value of the proportion of the last dollar of 
tax losses used by the corporation.I6  As shown in Mintz (1990), the marginal 
rate of return, gross of taxes, for a company in a tax-loss position depends on 
its history and whether capital is depreciated during the loss period. The mar- 
ginal rate of return is equal to the following: 
where A,  =  1 - (1 -  cx)T-r + A(l - a)=-[,  if  capital is depreciated for 
tax purposes during the loss period (as in the United States), and A, = A, if 
capital is not depreciated during the loss period (as in Canada). The term v is 
the effective statutory tax rate for the loss company, equal to su.  As before, Rf 
is the real cost of finance, pi(1 - v)  + (1 - p) p -  m. Note that A is the 
present value of  tax depreciation allowances that would be normally calcu- 
lated for a taxpaying firm, and A,- I  is the value of tax depreciation allowances 
calculated in the previous period. To compute ETRs for tax loss companies 
we use the Rg  given in equation (5). 
The final modification that we make to the base case analysis is the deter- 
mination of ETRs for multinational corporations. One of the important ques- 
tions raised in debates regarding capital mobility is whether companies of  a 
given country may find it advantageous to locate production facilities in an- 
other country. For multinational companies resident in a capital-exporting 
country, an additional level of taxation must be considered. This is the tax on 
foreign-source earnings that may be imposed by the home country. In Canada 
an exemption approach is used, and multinationals are allowed to repatriate 
15.  Capital deductions are mandatory in the U.S. and discretionary in Canada. Thus, although 
the carry-forward period in longer in the U.S.,  firms must continue to write off  assets during the 
loss period. In  Canada, deductions can be postponed until the firm  becomes taxable. See Mc- 
Kenzie and Mintz (1991) for a more in-depth discussion of the carryover provisions in the two 
countries. 
16. This is the procedure for “currently nontaxpaying” firms used in Mintz (1988). We use the 
Mintz figures for .$  in Canada. For the U.S.,  we use calculations provided in Altshuler and Auer- 
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dividends tax-free from foreign affiliates operating in the United States (a for- 
eign affiliate’s equity must be owned at least 10% by the parent). In the United 
States, a deferral approach is used, where the remitted foreign-source earn- 
ings received by  the parent from its subsidiary are taxed, but a foreign-tax 
credit for the corporate and withholding taxes attributed to those earnings is 
granted. If there are excess credits associated with a particular source of earn- 
ings, such as dividends (i.e., foreign-tax credits are more than U.S. tax liabil- 
ities on dividends received from Canada), the company may use the credits 
against U.S. tax liabilities on other foreign sources of income that are in the 
same “basket.” If  not all credits are fully used, the company is in an excess 
foreign-tax-credit position. If the credits are fully used, the company is in an 
overall deficient foreign-tax-credit-position. 
Under the deferral method, the cost of capital for the multinational depends 
on the functional currency used  by  the home country to convert subsidiary 
income into home country tax liabilities. In the case of U.S. companies oper- 
ating in Canada, two functional currencies may be used, depending on the 
ownership of the subsidiary and the type of business. A qualifying U.S. mul- 
tinational company may use the U.S . dollar as the functional currency. In this 
case, foreign-source income is measured by converting Canadian dollars into 
U.S. dollars as the income is earned. The alternative is to use the Canadian 
dollar as the functional currency. In that case, foreign-source income is mea- 
sured in U.S. dollars only when the income is remitted. The difference be- 
tween these two approaches leads to two different costs of capital. If the first 
approach is used, the tax depreciation allowances granted by the United States 
for foreign investments are calculated by  converting the cost of the asset into 
U.S.  dollars and  then depreciating that  amount. If  the  second approach is 
used, there is no conversion of asset values into U.S. dollars; instead, the U.S. 
determination of tax-depreciation allowances is based on the Canadian dollar, 
and depreciation claims are converted into U.S. dollars when the income is 
remitted. 
Leechor and Mintz (1990, 1991) provide the costs of capital for U.S. mul- 
tinational companies operating in Canada and for Canadian multinationals op- 
erating in the United States.”  In the case of  deferral taxation, the cost of 
capital depends upon the “tax-adjusted‘’ dividend-payout ratio of the multina- 
tional, the “repatriation tax” rate of  U.S. tax on remitted dividends (which 
could be positive or negative), and the capital-cost provisions of the home and 
host countries. We  use the before-tax rate of return on equity and the steady- 
state conditions for the capital stock to derive the repatriation tax rate on re- 
mitted dividends. The accounting dividend-payout ratio is used as a proxy for 
the tax-adjusted payout ratio, based on the U.S. definition of  subsidiary in- 
come earned in Canada. 
17.  Leechor and Mintz (1990, 1991) ignore rules regarding the attribution of interest that have 
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5.3  Comparative Analysis: The Base Case 
In this section we compare the ETR estimates for Canada and the United 
States for our “base case,” which employs the following assumptions: (i) the 
tax systems grant full loss offsets, or all firms are fully taxpaying;  (ii) the 
investments are riskless; (iii) there is open economy arbitrage with debt and 
equity income taxed at the same personal tax rate; and (iv) none of the invest- 
ments  involve  cross-border  direct  investment  by  multinationals.  Some of 
these assumptions will be modified in subsequent sections. 
ETRs were estimated for four years-1975,  1980, 1985, and 1990. These 
“snapshots” represent important periods in each country, when economic con- 
ditions and the tax regimes varied substantially. For example, 1975 and 1980 
were both periods of relatively high inflation with moderate real interest rates 
in both countries, while in  1985 and 1990, inflation rates were lower but real 
interest rates were higher. As we shall see, the interaction between the tax 
system and inflation and interest rates has important effects on ETR estimates. 
Moreover, the tax  systems in both countries underwent  important changes 
over the period considered. Two major regime changes occurred in the United 
States: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increased write-off rates and 
enhanced the ITC, while the Tax Reform Act of  1986 lowered depreciation 
rates, eliminated the ITC, and reduced the statutory tax rate. In Canada, in 
late 1977 the ITC (originally introduced in  1975) was enhanced, and a 3 per- 
cent inventory allowance was introduced to offset the taxation of inflationary 
gains on inventories due to the use of FIFO accounting. In 1986 the first stage 
of tax reform eliminated the inventory allowance, lowered ITC rates, and re- 
duced the statutory corporate tax rate slightly. In 1987 the process was contin- 
ued, as the ITC was virtually eliminated (except for a few regional credits), 
depreciation rates were lowered, and the tax rate was further reduced. 
We  begin  with a discussion of  the changes  in ETRs over time for each 
country and follow with a comparative discussion. The ETRs are listed  in 
table5.1. 
5.3.1  Canada 
In 1975, the weighted average ETR for the four types of capital across the 
nine industries was a very high 40.3% in Canada. The implication is that on 
average, in  1975 the Canadian tax system acted as a significant deterrent to 
investment.  When we examine individual assets and industries, we see that 
this figure does not tell the whole story. Investments in inventory capital were 
highly taxed in most sectors, with the exception of Agriculture, where inven- 
tories are expensed under cash accounting. The high rate of tax on inventory 
investment was due to the relatively high inflation rate in 1975, coupled with 
the use of FIFO (first in, first out) accounting, which results in the taxation of 
inflationary gains on inventories. Provisions to offset this (the inventory al- 203  Tax Effects on the Cost of Capital 
Table 5.1  Effective Tax Rates; Base Case 
1975  1980  1985  I990 
Industry or  United  United  United  United 











































22.1  16.5  31.9  31.7  27.6  26.2 
28.0  30.7  21.3  28.8  31.1  27.0 
62.3  35.8  45.7  34.4  43.4  24.0 
10.7  (67.8)  25.5  (12.0)  21.7  8.3 
(5.4)  34.5  26.2  23.7  17.5  25.2 
1.0  (25.3)  22.8  2.7  19.8  12.5 
41.9  20.0  31.5  31.4  34.9  24.8 
35.0  5.3  28.4  26.0  30.5  21.3 
19.0  (34.7)  26.2  13.8  22.9  16.1 
5.4  (0.2)  24.7  12.8  21.1  17.6 
14.2  10.0  16.2  1.6  25.6  18.9 
59.0  31.9  37.1  38.4  43.2  28.0 
(36.0)  (49.9)  29.3  27.7  20.2  19.0 
27.7  7.5  26.0  18.9  28.9  20.4 
Nore: Brackets indicate negative numbers. 
'AFF  = Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing; MAN  = Manufacturing; CON = Construction; T&S = Trans- 
portation and Storage; COM  = Communications; PUT = Public Utilities; WST = Wholesale Trade; 
RET  = Retail Trade; SER  = Services. BLD  =  buildings  and  structures; EQP  = machinery  and 
equipment; INV = inventories; LND = land. 
lowance) were not put in place until 1977. As a result, industries that devote 
a large proportion of their investments to inventories, such as Construction, 
Wholesale Trade, and Retail Trade, tended to be highly taxed on average. By 
way of contrast, the high inflation rates and low real interest rates combined 
to provide a tax subsidy to investments in land, as evidenced by the negative 
ETR. This was due to the deductibility of nominal rather than real debt inter- 
est payments. As such, the tax subsidy was particularly large in highly lever- 
aged sectors such as Transportation and Storage and Services. 
In  1980, ETRs declined rather significantly in Canada, averaging 27.7% 
overall. The decline was due to a number of factors. First, there was a modest 
reduction in the corporate tax rate from 1975 (1 percentage point). Second, 
the higher inflation rate in  1980 tended to reduce the ETR on some assets 
while increasing it for others. With nominal debt interest deductibility and low 
real interest rates, for example,  there was  a substantial increase in the tax 
subsidy for investments in land ( -  36% in 1980 versus -  26% in 1975). If it 
had not been for the introduction of the inventory allowance in 1977, the high 
inflation rate would have also increased the ETR on inventories relative to 
1975. As it turned out, the inventory allowance actually resulted in a decline 
in the ETR on inventories, from about 68% in 1975 to 59% in 1980. Finally, 204  Kenneth J. McKenzie and Jack M. Mintz 
investment tax credits were somewhat richer in 1980, with a basic rate of 7% 
versus 5% in 1975. This was particularly important for equipment, where the 
effective ITC rate was higher and asset lives shorter. Thus, the ETR on equip- 
ment declined from 28.5% in  1975 to  14.2% in  1980. The Manufacturing 
sector was a particular beneficiary of  the enhanced ITC. The ETR on build- 
ings also declined significantly, to only 5.4%, due to relatively low real inter- 
est rates and a high rate of inflation. 
In  1985, while the overall average ETR did not change very much (26% 
versus 28% in  1980), the configuration of EYRs changed considerably. This 
was the result almost entirely of changes in inflation and real interest rates, as 
the tax system was largely unchanged from 1980. In particular, a large reduc- 
tion in the rate of  inflation from 1980 to 1985 eliminated the tax subsidy on 
land, which now faced a positive ETR of 29% on average. The ETR on inven- 
tories declined substantially, from 59% in  1980 to 37% in 1985, also due to 
the reduction in inflation. The increase in real interest rates and reduction in 
inflation also caused the ETR on buildings to increase quite significantly, to 
24.7%.’* 
In  1986 and 1987, a tax reform was instituted in Canada. From the 1990 
ETR estimates, we see that the net result of this reform was actually a slight 
increase in the aggregate ETR, from 26% to almost 29%. However, inflation 
rates were somewhat higher and real interest rates were somewhat lower in 
1990 than in 1985. While these changes exacerbated the impact of the elimi- 
nation of the inventory allowance, they were offset somewhat by the reduction 
in the statutory tax rate. The net result was only a slight increase in the ETR 
on inventories, from 37% to 43%. The decline in the ETR on land was due 
largely to the reduction in the corporate tax rate. The ETR on buildings also 
declined slightly in 1990 from 1985. The elimination of the ITC did not have 
much of an impact on buildings, and the reduction in write-off rates was rela- 
tively minor for structures; the tax rate reduction thus offset these effects and 
lowered  the  ETR  on  buildings.  The ETR  on equipment was  substantially 
higher in 1989, particularly in the Manufacturing sector, because of the elim- 
ination of the ITC and the reduction in write-off rates, including the elimina- 
tion of the accelerated write-off for manufacturing and processing assets. As 
a result,  Manufacturing moved  from a position with  a lower-than-average 
ETR in  1985 (21%) to a higher-than-average ETR in  1989 (31%). Overall, 
the tax reforms tended to smooth ETRs across sectors and between assets. 
Investments in buildings,  equipment, and land all bear an ETR of  around 
22%, while inventories are more highly taxed at 43%, due to the use of FIFO 
accounting. 
18. These results generally correspond to the “prereform” estimates made by Jog and Mintz 
(1989).  Their effective tax rates on large companies were lower primarily due to the use of a lower 
discount rate for equity finance, where they assumed rn >  c, so that p is lower than i.  We take the 
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5.3.2  The United States 
In the United States, the overall ETR for the nine industries and four assets 
was  14.73%  in 1975.19  Investment in land was largely subsidized due to the 
relatively high rate of  inflation and the deductibility of  nominal borrowing 
costs, which proved beneficial for highly leveraged industries such as Trans- 
portation and Storage. The high inflation rate also led to a relatively high ETR 
on inventories. Although firms in the United States have the option of using 
LIFO (last in, first out) accounting, which eliminates the taxation of inflation- 
ary gains on inventories, about one-quarter of  businesses opt to use FIFO in 
any event, and the ETR estimates reflect this. The low ETR on equipment was 
due largely to a relatively rich ITC, which actually created a tax subsidy for 
investments in equipment in many industries. 
In  1980, the aggregate ETR was about half the  1975 rate, at 7.5%. This 
change occurred for a number of reasons, including a slight reduction in the 
corporate tax rate from 1975 (about 1 percentage point); enhanced ITCs (par- 
ticularly for some structures, such as those used  in the Transportation and 
Storage and the Public Utilities industries); and a higher inflation rate coupled 
with a lower real rate of  interest, which increased the tax subsidy on invest- 
ments in land, again due to the use of nominal debt interest deductions. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 sought to increase corporate in- 
vestment in the United States by increasing write-off rates and enriching the 
ITC. Despite these measures, our estimates show that the average ETR actu- 
ally increased from 1980 to 1985, to almost 19%. The reason for this was the 
substantial increase in real interest rates, which led to an elimination of  the 
tax  subsidy on land. Land had a positive ETR of  almost 28% on average. 
The increase in real interest rates also led to an increase in the ETR on inven- 
tories and buildings. Despite the increase in real interest rates, the enhanced 
write-offs and ITCs led to a significant decline in the ETR on machinery and 
equipment, which benefited the most from the tax changes. In 1985, invest- 
ments in equipment were virtually distortion-free, with an  average ETR of 
approximately 2%.  The Communications, Manufacturing, and Construction 
industries all had lower ETRs in 1985 relative to 1980, despite the higher real 
interest rates. 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 sought to eliminate many of  the tax breaks 
introduced in 198  1 and earlier. The result was an increase in the average ETR 
to over 20%. The elimination of the ITC and the reduction in tax depreciation 
rates were particularly important for investments in equipment. On average, 
19. Results reported here and below roughly correspond to those reported by Auerbach (1983). 
who provided us with U.S. data on depreciation and asset classes. The main difference in our 
results and his is that we use a weighted average discount rate based on estimates of the debvasset 
ratios by industry and the observed interest rates for the U.S.,  while Auerbach used a constant 4% 
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investments in equipment moved from a position of virtual neutrality in 1985 
to a positive average ETR of almost 19% in 1990. The ETR on buildings also 
increased slightly, due to longer write-off periods. The elimination of the ITC 
and lengthening of write-off periods for depreciable assets were offset by a tax 
rate reduction of over 10 percentage points. As a result of this rate reduction, 
the ETRs on investments in both land and inventories decreased significantly 
from their 1985 levels. Overall, the tax reforms in 1986 served to smooth out 
the ETRs among assets and across sectors. In fact, buildings, equipment, and 
land all had an ETR of around 18.5%,  while inventories were taxed at a higher 
rate of 28% (because of the elective use of FIFO accounting by some busi- 
nesses).  Moreover,  the large tax  subsidies that had existed for some indus- 
tries, particularly Transportation and Storage and Public Utilities, were elim- 
inated. All sectors had a positive ETR in 1990. 
5.3.3  Comparing Effective Tax Rates 
We now turn to a more direct comparison of ETRs between the two coun- 
tries. There are a number of similarities, particularly in the pattern of changes 
in ETRs over time. In both countries, the 1970s and early 1980s were typified 
by a wide divergence of ETRs across assets and industries, with investments 
in  some  assets  and  industries  highly  subsidized  while  others  were  highly 
taxed.  In  1990,  following  the  tax  reforms  in  both  countries,  ETRs were 
“smoothed” substantially across assets and among industries. In both coun- 
tries, overall ETRs declined rather significantly from 1975 to 1980, then in- 
creased slightly in 1985 and again in 1990. This pattern in large part resulted 
from similar movements in inflation and interest rates in the two countries. 
However, parallel  tax-regime changes also contributed.  For example,  in the 
late  1970s  and early  1980s  both  countries  modestly  reduced  corporate tax 
rates and enhanced ITCs, and in the mid-1980s both implemented tax reforms 
of a similar nature, eliminating ITCs, lowering depreciation rates, and reduc- 
ing statutory tax rates. 
Although there are similarities,  the differences  in ETRs between  the two 
countries  are perhaps  more  striking.  Most  obvious  is  the  fact  that  overall 
ETRs in  Canada have tended to be higher than  those in the United  States, 
particularly in 1975 and 1980. This difference was due to number of factors, 
three of  which appear to be particularly important. The first was the invest- 
ment tax credit.  Prior to the elimination of the credit in both countries,  the 
ITC in the United States was richer than in Canada.  The basic ITC rate was 
higher,20 the credit was available for a broader range of  assets (structures in 
particular),  and, depreciation deductions were not reduced by ITC claims in 
the  United  States (unlike Canada)  until after  1980,  and then  only partially. 
20.  This is not strictly true, as historically ITC rates vary by region in Canada, with very high 
rates available in regions considered economically depressed. However, investment in these high- 
ITC regions has typically been low relative to the rest of the country; their presence has very little 
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The more generous ITC in the United States was particularly advantageous for 
investments in equipment. A second reason for the higher ETRs in  Canada 
was the optional use of LIFO accounting for inventories in the United States 
and the mandatory use of FIFO in Canada. As discussed above, the use of 
FIFO leads to the taxation of  inflationary gains in the cost of  inventories, 
which significantly increases the ETR on inventories during high inflation pe- 
riods, such as 1975 and 1980. Although some firms in the United States use 
FIFO in any event, and the inventory allowance moderated the impact of infla- 
tion in Canada somewhat in  1980 and 1985, the ETR  on inventories in the 
United States has tended to be lower than in Canada. For example, in 1990 
the overall ETR on investments in inventories was 15.2% higher in Canada. 
The third factor contributing to higher ETRs in Canada was the slightly higher 
rates of  inflation. The open economy arbitrage model used for the base case 
restricts real interest rates to be the same in both countries. However, inflation 
rates, and therefore nominal interest rates, have been higher in Canada than in 
the United States over the period examined. This has been an important factor 
in the higher ETRs in Canada for assets like inventories, structures, and cer- 
tain forms of equipment. 
Despite the historical differences, ETRs in the two countries have moved 
closer together recently. Similar tax changes no doubt contributed to this. Tax 
reforms contributed to the decline in  the overall aggregate ETR differential 
between the two countries, from 25.6% in  1975 to only 8.5% in 1990. By 
examining each industry and asset class individually, we  see that differences 
between Canadian and U.S.  ETRs declined virtually across the board from 
1975 to  1990. Insofar as ETRs in the two countries have moved closer to- 
gether, the corporate tax regimes seem to have become more “harmonious.” 
Indeed, ETRs on buildings, equipment, and land were quite similar in 1990 
(the fourth asset, inventories, is highly taxed in Canada). The overall ETRs in 
key  sectors such as Manufacturing, which accounts for more than 30% of 
nonresource investment in both the United States and Canada, were also very 
close. Yet  even though it appears that overall the Canadian and U.S. tax sys- 
tems have become more harmonious over time, considerable differences re- 
main  in  specific’  sectors.  For example,  in  1990 Canadian ETRs exceeded 
United States ETRs by  19.5% in Construction, 13.4% in Transportation and 
Storage, and 10.1% in Wholesale Trade. 
Given the apparent convergence in overall ETRs over time, it  might be 
argued that the governments deliberately attempted to harmonize the corpo- 
rate tax systems. At times, specific provisions such as the DISC program in 
the United States and accelerated depreciation for manufacturing in Canada 
were implemented in response to international trends. But there is little direct 
evidence of  an  intent by  Canada and the United States to harmonize their 
corporate tax systems in the late  1980s. Canada’s corporate income tax re- 
form, which actually began prior to U.S. reform, was mainly concerned with 
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stantial amount of tax-loss carry-forwards and with a desire to make the tax 
system less distortive.  U.S.  tax reform was largely motivated by a desire to 
improve upon the efficiency of the tax system and upon the mix between cor- 
porate and personal tax revenues (with a shift toward collecting more revenue 
from the corporate sector). Although the countries ended up adopting similar 
reforms (as have other countries around the world), we would argue that this 
result may have occurred more by accident than by design.21 
Another important point to note is that the absence of indexing for inflation 
in both  tax  systems may  well  lead  to a greater divergence in ETRs in the 
future, even if no other tax changes are made.  As indicated above, ETRs in 
both Canada and the United States are highly sensitive to interest and inflation 
rates. If the inflation rate in either country changes significantly relative to the 
other, ETRs will diverge. 
5.4  Changes in the Underlying Assumptions 
A number of assumptions underlie the base case estimates discussed above. 
In our view, there is no single or unique method to measure ETRs that captures 
all of  the  institutional details of the tax systems and economies of  the two 
countries, in part because there is no consensus regarding the appropriate as- 
sumptions that should underlie  the model.  In this  section,  we examine the 
implications of modifying some of the assumptions. In particular,  we exam- 
ine: a different treatment of risk; an alternative view of financial arbitrage; the 
presence of nontaxpaying companies; and multinational companies. 
5.4.1  Capital Risk 
In the base case, it was assumed that investments were riskless.  As dis- 
cussed  in  section 5.2, ETRs on riskless  and  income-risky  investments are 
identical  if  the  tax  system  grants  full loss offsets.  This is not the case for 
capital risk. Since tax depreciation allowances are determined ex ante, based 
upon the original or historic cost of the asset, these allowances do not fluctuate 
with unforeseen  changes in the replacement  values of  assets.  As such, the 
economic cost of bearing capital risk is not fully deducted, even with full loss 
offsetting.  Unless an upward adjustment is made in the tax-depreciation  rate 
to account for capital risk (something done by neither country explicitly), we 
would  expect the  distortions  caused  by  the  tax  systems  to be  higher  for 
capital-risky investments in both the United States and Canada. 
This expectation is confirmed in table 5.2, where we see that the presence 
of capital risk leads to a significant increase in ETRs. In 1990, the aggregate 
Canadian ETR on capital-risky assets was almost 48%, versus 29% for com- 
parable riskless or income-risky investments; for the United States, the figures 
21. John Whalley discusses this issue in more detail in the introduction to this volume. 209  Tax Effects on the Cost of Capital 
Table 5.2  Effective Tax Rates, 1990 
~ 
Base Case  Capital Risk  Closed Economy 
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“As defined in table 5.1 
were 38% and 20%, respectively. Both systems thus act to significantly deter 
investments characterized by capital risk, to a much greater extent than com- 
parable riskless or income-risky investments. 
The presence of capital risk does not alter our general conclusion that the 
current tax system in the United States is less distortive than the Canadian 
system. Indeed, if anything the ETR in favor of the United States appears to 
be even greater than it was with riskless investments. For example, the aggre- 
gate ETR for riskless investments was 8.5% higher in Canada than in the 
United States; for capital-risky investments the Canadian aggregate ETR ex- 
ceeded the American by  10%. One reason for this is the higher statutory tax 
rate in Canada, which penalizes capital risk. For Manufacturing, where the 
statutory tax rates of the two countries are much closer, the ETRs were almost 
the same. 
5.4.2  Closed Economy Arbitrage 
As discussed in section 5.2,  there are other financial arbitrage assumptions 
that may be used to assess the impact of taxes on capital-investment  decisions. 
One possibility is closed economy household arbitrage, in which both per- 
sonal and corporate taxes in the home country affect the user cost of  capital 
faced by domestic firms. In table 5.2 we report ETRs under the closed econ- 
omy assumption, in which households in each country must earn the same 
net-of-personal-tax rate of return on equity and bond  assets. Allowing per- 
sonal taxes on interest and equity income to differ according to estimates of 
effective personal  tax rates in Canada and the United States (in both cases 210  Kenneth J. McKenzie and Jack M. Mintz 
rn >  c),  we compute the combined corporate and personal tax rate on capital.22 
These numbers are not strictly comparable to those in the base case, since the 
base  case provides  only  an effective  corporate tax rate  (domestic personal 
taxes do not affect the level of investment under our open economy arbitrage 
assumption). 
Given that the closed economy  case includes domestic personal  taxes on 
capital income, it is not surprising to find that ETRs are about 20 percentage 
points higher than the base case. What might be surprising is that the differ- 
ences in  ETRs between  the two countries  are  similar to those in the  open 
economy base case. The reason is that our calculations of  the effective per- 
sonal tax rate on nominal interest income for the United States and Canada are 
very  close, at about 25%; similarly,  the ETR on nominal  equity income is 
about  8% in both  countries  (assuming that the capital-gains tax rate, rather 
than  dividend tax  rate,  is the most important factor influencing  the cost of 
equity finance). On the basis of these calculations, we conclude that the effec- 
tive personal tax rates are more harmonized in Canada and the United States 
than  the  corporate  tax rates!  This might be considered  anomalous,  as one 
might expect countries to be more concerned about the harmonization of cor- 
porate income tax systems than personal tax systems; the latter depend on the 
residence of households, which are far less mobile. 
5.4.3  Tax-Loss Firms and Imperfect Loss Offsetting 
Another important consideration for a United States-Canada  comparison is 
the presence of nontaxpaying companies. As also discussed in section 5.2, we 
consider only one particular case of tax losses, in which a firm is assumed to 
be in a tax-loss position currently and expects to remain so for some specified 
amount of  time.  As a result, our estimates of  ETRs are lower for loss firms 
than for fully taxpaying companies.  However, our calculations may tend  to 
understate the ETR on companies with tax losses since, under alternative ap- 
proaches,  tax losses could increase rather than reduce ETRs.  For example, 
Mintz (1988) and Jog and Mintz (1989) show that in some cases, loss firms 
may face very high ETRs relative to fully taxpaying firms. 
We compute the cost of capital for tax-loss companies in the United States 
and Canada, taking into account the flexibility allowed in Canada in claiming 
tax-depreciation allowances; see equation (5) above. Aside from full loss off- 
setting, we use the base case assumptions and assume risk neutrality. Using 
calculations  from  Altshuler  and  Auerbach  (1990),  we  estimate  that in  the 
United States only 20% of investment was undertaken by tax-loss companies 
in 1990, which expect, on average, to be nontaxpaying for about eight years.23 
22.  Canadian  calculations  are  based  on  Glenday  (1989) and  Boadway,  Bruce, and  Mintz 
(1987). U.S. numbers are based on data given to us by James Poterba and Alan Auerbach. 
23.  Altshuler  and Auerbach  (1990) calculate that another large portion of  companies were 
constrained in claiming investment tax credits in 198 1. We assume that all these companies would 
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Using 1977-85  data from the Department of  Finance, compiled by Glenday 
and  Mintz  1991, we  estimate that  approximately 50% of  investment was 
undertaken by tax-loss companies in Canada, and that Canadian tax-loss com- 
panies take an average of eleven years to become taxpaying. We  suspect that 
one of the reasons for the shorter tax-loss period in the United States is the use 
for tax purposes of consolidated accounting, which allows associated compa- 
nies to aggregate profits and losses. Consolidation is not allowed in Canada. 
Table  5.3 provides ETR estimates for taxpaying and  illustrative tax-loss 
firms in Canada and the United States. It is immediately apparent that the ETR 
on loss companies was far lower in Canada. The lower ETR on loss compa- 
nies in Canada arises for two reasons: the longer estimated time for Canadian 
companies to become taxpaying, and the ability of  Canadian companies to 
postpone depreciation deductions until they become taxpaying. 
It is interesting to consider the ETRs aggregated over taxpaying and non- 
taxpaying companies. As shown in the last column of  table 5.3, the overall 
aggregate Canadian ETR was  virtually identical to the U.S. ETR  (18.7%, 
compared to 19.2%). In fact, Canadian ETRs were lower for the Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing, Manufacturing, and Communications industries. There 
was also a reversal of ETRs on buildings, machinery, and land, with Canadian 
ETRs now lower than U.S. ETRs. 
These  calculations emphasize that  conclusions regarding the  impact of 
taxes on capital can be  reversed if  certain institutional details, such as tax 
losses, are taken into account. Although, as emphasized above, the ETRs re- 












Taxpaying Firmsb  Loss Firms  Aggregate 
Canada  United States 
27.6  26.2 
31.1  27.0 
43.4  29.0 
21.7  8.3 
17.5  25.2 
19.8  12.5 
34.9  24.8 
30.5  21.3 
22.9  16.  I 
Canada  United States 
8.6  17.0 
1.9  11.0 
6.3  15.7 
6.6  18.0 
6.9  23.1 
6.6  17.6 
2.6  8.8 
2.9  8.7 
4.0  9.3 
Canada  United States 
17.8  24.3 
20.5  24.6 
31.4  27.0 
14.8  10.4 
12.5  24.8 
13.6  13.5 
24.8  22.7 
21.4  19.5 
14.9  14.9 
BLD  21.1  17.6  4.2  14.8  13.8  17.1 
EQP  25.6  18.9  5.7  20. I  17.2  19.1 
INV  43.2  28.0  1.1  6.4  28.6  24.8 
LND  20.2  19.0  1.8  4.5  12.3  16.6 
Total  28.9  20.4  3.8  13.7  18.7  19.2 
'As defined in table 5.1 
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ported for loss companies may be understated, they suggest that we may not 
know as much as we would like to about how taxes influence the cost of capi- 
tal in either Canada or the United States. 
5.4.4  Multinationals 
A comparison of  the ETRs on direct investments undertaken by  multina- 
tional corporations may well be the most relevant of all, as cross-border direct 
investment flows are likely to be quite sensitive to differences in tax regimes. 
As discussed in section 5.2, when evaluating the ETRs imposed on resident 
multinationals, one must take account of the tax treatment of foreign-source 
income. 
In table 5.4, we present 1990 effective corporate tax rate estimates for U.S. 
multinationals investing in Canada through a subsidiary, and for Canadian- 
based multinationals investing in the United States through a subsidiary. For 
the U.S. multinational, three cases are considered: overall deficient credit po- 
sition with the use of the U.S. dollar as the functional currency; overall defi- 
cient tax-credit position with the use of the Canadian dollar as the functional 
currency; and overall excess credit position. It has been argued by U.S. Trea- 
sury officials that most U.S. multinationals would be in an excess tax-credit 
Table 5.4  Effective Tax Rates, 1990 
U.S. Multinational 
Deficient Credit  United 
Excess  Canada  Canada  States 





















n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
33.0  33.2  26.9 
42.0  42.8  33.9 
14.0  24.7  5.1 
18.4  21.4  5.8 
19.7  21.8  9.8 
26.4  28.6  22.1 
23.3  27.8  20.2 
36.3  41.5  35.5 
28.1  30.5  21.8 
27.6  26.2 
31.1  27.0 
43.4  29.0 
21.7  8.3 
17.5  25.2 
19.8  12.5 
34.9  24.8 
30.5  21.3 
22.9  16.1 
28.9  20.4 
'As  defined in table 5.1. 
bU.S.  multinational operating in Canada in a deficient foreign-tax-credit position; functional cur- 
rency denominated in U.S. dollars. 
<U.S.  multinational operating in Canada in a deficient foreign-tax-credit position; functional cur- 
rency denominated in Canadian dollars. 
dU.S.  multinational oeprating in Canada in an excess foreign-tax-credit position. 
Canadian multinational operating in the U.S. 
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position after the 1987 tax reform. However, many U.S. companies are chang- 
ing the ownership and financial structure of  their subsidiaries so as to fully 
utilize excess credits. This means that the deficient credit case may be the 
most relevant in the future. Moreover, as will be confirmed below by our esti- 
mates, there can be an incentive for companies to be in deficient credit posi- 
tion. As Leechor and Mintz (1991) discuss, one important strategy is for the 
subsidiary to increase its leverage so that excess credits can be fully used. 
For a Canadian multinational investing in the United States, remitted divi- 
dends from foreign affiliates operating in the United States are essentially ex- 
empt from the Canadian corporate tax. This case is similar to that of  a U.S. 
multinational being in an excess credit position. 
We  first deal with U.S. multinationals operating in Canada and determine 
whether a U.S. multinational would prefer investing in a Canadian subsidiary 
rather than at home. The ETRs for U.S. multinationals operating in Canada 
are reported in the first three columns of  table 5.4, while the last column 
contains estimates for U.S. domestic investments. A comparison of these fig- 
ures shows that overall the ETR for U.S. companies operating domestically is 
slightly lower than for all three cases of U.S. subsidiaries operating in Can- 
ada. The aggregate ETR, for example, is 20.4% for domestic investment and 
ranges from 25.8%  to 30.5% for investments in Canada. The implication is 
that the tax  systems tend to discourage U.S.-based firms from investing in 
Canadian subsidiaries. An important reason for this is that U.S.-based firms 
must use a less generous tax depreciation schedule for capital employed in 
other countries; straight-line depreciation based upon ADR (asset deprecia- 
tion  range)  midpoint  lives  must  be  used  for  foreign  investments,  while 
MACRS (modified accelerated cost recovery system) may be used for invest- 
ments at home. 
For Canadian companies operating in the United States, the opposite situa- 
tion arises, as the ETR on investments by Canadian firms in the United States 
is slightly less than the ETR on domestic investments. Canadian-based multi- 
nationals thus have a small incentive to invest in U.S. subsidiaries rather than 
at home. This is not surprising, given the exemption approach followed in 
Canada, and it reflects the same factors that lower ETRs on U.S. domestic 
investments relative to Canadian domestic investments. 
The ETRs on investments made by  Canadian companies in  the United 
States tend to be slightly higher than for U.S .-owned domestic investments. 
This is due to our assumption that Canadian companies issue some debt in 
Canada to finance investments by subsidiaries in the United States. Whether 
it is cheaper to issue debt in the United States rather than in Canada depends 
upon differences in statutory tax and inflation rates. Debt is more likely to be 
issued in the country with the higher corporate tax rate and higher inflation 
rate. If we had assumed that the debt was raised in the United States, the ETRs 
would have been identical for Canadian multinational and U.S. domestic in- 214  Kenneth J. McKenzie and Jack M. Mintz 
vestments. The same applies for U.S. companies in the excess credit position 
and Canadian domestic investments, where it is assumed that U.S. companies 
issue some debt in the United States. The fact that the ETRs are not signifi- 
cantly different suggests that there is not a large incentive for companies to 
issue more debt in Canada or the United States. This absence of  incentive is 
the result of the  similarity  in  statutory corporate tax rates and the rates of 
inflation. 
5.5  Summary and Conclusions 
We  conclude  that  for fully taxpaying  companies  investing domestically, 
ETRs in Canada are somewhat higher than those in the United States. This is 
due in large part to the significantly  higher ETR on inventories  in Canada. 
Similarly, Canadian multinationals face lower ETRs on direct investments in 
the United States than on domestic investments, while for U.S. multinationals 
the ETR on domestic investments is lower. ETRs for nontaxpaying companies 
in Canada are significantly lower than for their U.S. counterparts, due partly 
to the flexibility granted to Canadian loss companies when claiming deprecia- 
tion deductions.  Aggregated over fully taxpaying and tax-loss firms, overall 
ETRs are very similar in the two countries. 
As there appears to have been a convergence in aggregate ETRs across the 
two countries in recent years, we find that the corporate tax systems in the 
United States and Canada have become more “harmonious.” Although we be- 
lieve that this convergence may have occurred more by accident than design, 
tax reform in both countries has no doubt contributed to it. Nevertheless, sig- 
nificant differences in ETRs remain and may become greater in the future, if 
large  differences  in inflation  and  interest  rates  between  the  two  countries 
emerge. 
Throughout  our discussion,  we have  argued  that there is no single ETR 
estimate that easily captures the institutional features of the economies and tax 
systems of the two countries.  We  have tried to address some of the  issues 
involved by computing ETRs under a number of  alternative assumptions re- 
garding the treatment of risk, financial arbitrage, tax losses, and multinational 
investments. We  do not believe, however, that we have addressed all of the 
interesting problems that arise in the measurement of  ETRs on capital. Re- 
maining problems include the treatment of minimum taxes, financial and in- 
flation risk, resource firms, real estate, regulated and finance companies, ad- 
justment costs, and international tax planning. Moreover, the paucity of data 
has not allowed us to incorporate other taxes that may be relevant to capital 
decision making, such as property taxes,  sales taxes on capital inputs,  the 
corporate  minimum  tax,  and provincial capital taxes.  Despite these  limita- 
tions, we suspect that our general conclusions regarding the level of corporate 
taxation in Canada relative to the United States are at least qualitatively accu- 
rate. 215  Tax Effects on the Cost of Capital 
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